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Consensus Decisionmaking in NATO: French
Unilateralism and the Decision to Defend Turkey
Aaron D. Lindstrom*

On January 15, 2003, the United States formally requested that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") begin planning to defend one of its
members, Turkey, from any counterstrikes launched by Iraq in the event of a
war with Iraq. France, Germany, and Belgium, concerned that such a move by
NATO would send a message that war with Iraq was inevitable, resisted the
request. 2 In response, Turkey, the only member of NATO that shares a border
with Iraq, pressed the issue by invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty,3
which provides that "[t]he Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion
of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any
of the Parties is threatened.",4 Despite Turkey's plea for collective defense, which
is the purpose of NATO, France and the others continued to block any planning
for almost a month.' Because NATO operates under consensus decisionmaking,
the votes of these three nations barred defensive preparation by NATO in
support of Turkey.
NATO finally resolved the issue by moving the decision into its Defense
Planning Committee ("DPC"), thereby circumventing France's veto.6 With
France excluded, Germany and Belgium compromised and agreed to support
the measure.' As a result, NATO committed to provide some assets for the
defense of Turkey without the full consensus of its members.
NATO's decision highlights a conflict between NATO's requirement of
unanimity in decisionmaking and its obligation to provide collective defense.
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This development examines the decision and attempts to answer the following
questions: Did NATO's decision without France's consent violate the North
Atlantic Treaty? Did France violate the treaty by refusing to fulfill its obligation
to defend a fellow NATO member? What does NATO's decision imply for the
future of NATO?
I. DID BYPASSING FRANCE VIOLATE THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY?
NATO, as an alliance among sovereign nations, reaches decisions by the
consensus of its members: bypassing France appears to violate established
custom. Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty created a council consisting of
representatives of every member nation.8 The North Atlantic Council, as it is
called:
is the only body within the Alliance which derives its authority explicitly
from the North Atlantic Treaty.... All member countries of NATO have
an equal right to express their views round the Council table. Decisions are
the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by
common consent.9
While the wording of the treaty does not explicitly state a consensus or
unanimity requirement, the status of the member nations as sovereign states
implies it.' ° Further, the practice has been consistently followed in the Council
since 1949,11 arguably making the procedure a custom, which is another source
of binding international law. 2
While the preceding cursory examination of international law appears to
condemn NATO's action, two arguments convincingly defend NATO's
procedural device: first, France consented to NATO making some military
decisions without its approval when it withdrew from NATO's military structure
in 1966, and second, NATO's remaining military structure has the authority to
8
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make defensive plans through the DPC when there is unanimous consent within
the DPC."3
A. THE IMPACT OF FRANCE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO'S
MILITARY STRUCTURE

In early 1966, French president Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from
NATO's military organization." As a consequence of its withdrawal, France
relinquished its share of authority over that organization. In a successful attempt
to keep France involved, the alliance responded by emphasizing both the
political and military functions of NATO." While France did remain a party to
the treaty, it decided to fulfill its obligations while retaining direct control over
its military. 6
France's partial break with NATO, however, also resulted in France's
withdrawal from the DPC. Springing from de Gaulle's desire to protect French
sovereignty, the break led to a "de facto restructuring of the decision-making
process in order to protect the common interest from national particularism. ' ' 8
While this de facto restructuring does not deprive France of its voice (or veto) in
making policy decisions on the North Atlantic Council, it does remove France's
authority to contribute to DPC decisions about where to station NATO forces
and about how NATO forces may be employed to provide collective force.
France's loss of authority in planning NATO's military operations is
consistent with the importance of consent in international law. France's
voluntary withdrawal from NATO's military organization demonstrated its
ability to contract with other nations through treaties and its authority to
negotiate to change its obligations. 9 France relinquished some control over
NATO's military decisions under its unified command structure in return for, in
de Gaulle's view, greater French autonomy and a preservation of French
sovereignty. When France correspondingly lost its seat on the Defense Planning
Committee, the subsequent restructuring reflected France's surrender of a veto
with respect to the organization of NATO's military arm.

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

Eriksen, The Committee System of the NATO Coundl at 44 (cited in note 10) (explaining that
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Fall2003

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Even apart from France's consent, however, the de facto restructuring of
NATO amounts to a change in custom. While the question of when a practice
becomes a custom with legal significance under international law is a difficult
one with many factors,2" the change within NATO does rise to the level of
'general practice,' [which is] usually defined as practice by a significant number
of representative states concerned with the subject., 21 Since 1966, all of the
members of NATO have operated without French participation in NATO's
military organization; thus, accord by all of the relevant states constitutes a
general practice. Additionally, NATO's actions during the first Gulf War provide
precedent for acting without French assent. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, "[a]
similar procedural tactic was used . . . as a way to skirt French objections to
NATO sending its Allied Command Europe Mobile Force to southeastern
22
Turkey.,
B. DEFENSIVE PLANNING
The DPC acted within the scope of its power when it approved planning
by NATO to defend Turkey. As its name implies, the Defense Planning
Committee "deals with most defence matters and subjects related to collective
defence planning., 23 Defense planning implies making decisions that fall short of
making large policy determinations, but defending Turkey is not a policy
decision-the treaty guarantees Turkey's defense.
The North Atlantic Treaty creates an obligation that each signing party will
act in the collective defense of any party that is attacked. Article 5 states that:
an armed attack against one or more [NATO members] in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of
the right of individual or collective self-defense . .. will assist the Party or
Parties so attacked .... 24
The obligation to defend seems to include the lesser obligation to plan for a
defense and to make purely defensive preparations prior to a possible attack.
Within NATO's structure, the Defense Planning Committee shoulders the lesser
obligation; France, because of its decision to control its military separately, bears
an independent obligation to plan also for the defense of its allies. Therefore,
NATO's unanimous decision in the DPC is merely a decision to fulfill its
20

Henkin, InternationalLaw at 29-30 (cited in note 10) (listing factors for judging if a practice
has become a custom, but noting that "every 'piece' of customary law is different, develops
in different circumstances, at a different rate of growth").
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obligation despite France's attempts to obstruct the accomplishment of NATO's
obligation for its political purposes.
It seems implausible to contend that NATO would exceed its authority by
merely planning to protect Turkey."5 Indeed, the power to plan for collective
defense is necessary for the power to respond in collective defense to be
effective; arguing otherwise relegates NATO to making ad hoc responses. The
structure of NATO as a principally military organization supports such an
understanding and implies that the parties agreed to defensive planning;
planning is arguably the most important part of any military operation. The
existence of a Defense Planning Committee since 1963 further reinforces this
26
point.
In the current dispute, the particular forces sent to Turkey were defensive,
consisting of early warning AWACs aircraft, Patriot air defense anti-missile
systems, and chemical and biological defense units.2 Moreover, the DPC was
careful in its statement to say, "This decision relates only to the defense of
Turkey, and is without prejudice to any other military operations by NATO, and
future decisions by NATO or the UN Security Council., 28 Thus, NATO's
decision to plan to defend Turkey without reaching consensus in the North
Atlantic Council was legitimate.

II. DID FRANCE VIOLATE THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY BY
REFUSING TO PLAN FOR TURKEY'S DEFENSE?
Because the need to defend Turkey was still inchoate at the time of the
decision, France did not fail to meet its treaty obligations. While the preceding
arguments about France's lessened authority in NATO might suggest relieving
France of any wrongdoing by refusing to plan for Turkey's defense, the de facto
restructuring of NATO's military organization did not remove France's
obligation to defend Turkey; it merely created a procedural avenue useful for
fulfilling NATO's defense obligation without France's support. France,
however, "undermined the alliance's core commitment, the very reason why
NATO came into being 54 years ago-to defend a threatened ally."29 Because

the need for defense was still embryonic at the time, France did not actually
breach its duties, yet its political maneuvering undermined the deterrent effect of
NATO and called into question NATO's prospects for the future.
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If the coalition-led war on Iraq had not successfully seized and retained the
initiative during the war and if Iraq had managed to launch an attack on Turkey,
France would have had an individual duty to contribute to the collective defense
of Turkey. Under Article 5, an armed attack on Turkey would require that "each
[NATO member] . . .assist [Turkey] by taking forthwith, individualy and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force." 3 This language demonstrates that each nation has some
level of obligation to take action in response to an attack on another NATO
member. What this level of obligation is, though, remains in question.
France could assert wide freedom under Article 5 to choose what level of
action "it [France] deems necessary."'" If this interpretation is correct, and
"member nations have the ability to determine their own involvement, 2 France
could claim that no obligation really exists or could claim to meet its obligations
while providing only negligible assistance, such as potentially redundant
intelligence information. Such an interpretation, while plausible, renders the
North Atlantic Treaty ineffectual.33 In contract terms, reading the treaty that way
would render each nation's promise illusory; the lack of mutual obligation would
mean there was no contract, or treaty, in the first place. A more reasonable
interpretation, then, would infer an implied promise to make good faith efforts
to take a reasonable level of action.34 Under this second interpretation, France
would breach the North Atlantic Treaty if it failed to take reasonable action in
good faith to defend Turkey.
III. WHAT DOES THE DISPUTE OVER PLANNING TO DEFEND
TURKEY IMPLY FOR NATO's FUTURE?
Because eighteen of nineteen members of NATO did continue to honor
their obligations, NATO remains strong at its core; France's participation in
NATO (or, rather, its lack thereof), however, faces a bleaker outlook. NATO
seems confronted with a choice: either remain committed to collective self-
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Michael A. Goldberg, Mirage of Defense: Reexamining Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty after
the TerroistAttacks on the UnitedStates, 26 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 77, 85 (2003).
The drafting history of Article 5 shows that the US specifically wanted this phrasing to
remove "any implication that there would be an automatic commitment" of force without
complying with constitutional provisions. Id at 85-88. This desired limitation seems
unnecessary given Article 11's caveat that the treaty's provisions would be "carried out by the
Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." North Atlantic Treaty
art 11 (cited in note 4).
As Benjamin Cardozo said, "A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be
'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed. If that is so, there is a contract." Wood v
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defense at the expense of French input or erode NATO's strength and ability to
deter through the intransigence of one member.
If NATO continues on its current course, further tension between France
and other NATO members, particularly the United States, seems inevitable.
France's actions might result from "what it sees as Washington's growing
dominance and perceived disregard for the opinions of its allies."35 Indeed,
recent debate on the war on Iraq included frequent accusations of unilateralism
against the United States for its pressure on the international community to
enforce a unanimous UN resolution.
Unilateralism, however, more accurately describes France's approach to
NATO. Even prior to 1966, France under de Gaulle withdrew its Mediterranean
and Atlantic fleets from NATO and declined to cooperate in other military
operations. 36 In 1966, France completely withdrew from NATO's military
organization, leading President Johnson to comment, "The United States
Government cannot, therefore, understand the basis upon which the French
government has concluded, without consulting the other parties to the Treaty,
that it is impossible to amend the NATO arrangements and that it must act
unilaterally., 37 In 1991 and again in 2003, the other eighteen members of NATO
had to maneuver through the Defense Planning Committee to circumvent
France's single vote. As one commentator said, "A good case could be made for
voting France out of NATO, simply because it has no wish to cooperate with
' 38
the other 18 members.
If France continues as a member of NATO without committing more fully
to defending its allies, NATO will weaken as a regional power purportedly
committed to collective defense. Shortly after France's refusal to support
defense planning for Turkey, a Polish diplomat commented, "'If you ask me,...
France was signing the death warrant of NATO ...
While such a prognosis
is probably overly fatalistic, NATO must either continue to dilute France's role
or lose its credibility as an organization of collective self-defense. After all,
"[w]hat is 4the
purpose or value of a mutual aid society that doesn't aid its
0
members?"
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